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INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARIY
By Marcel Storme
Honorary President of the International Association of Procedural Law
"The way of Justice is a tightrope
where no prince is safe for one instant"
(W.H. Auden, The Sea and the Mirror, II).
Some years ago already, we compiled under the leadership of Shimon Shetreet a document in
which an attempt was made to draw up the "General Standards on the Independence of the
Judiciary' . And again we continued under the same guidance our quest for an independent
judiciary.
In this Report, I am seeking not only to demystify and put into its proper perspective the notion
of independence, but also to point, on the other hand, to the many ways in which the courts'
work is burdened with "bondages".
Also, quite apart from the important debate surrounding the independence of the courts, the
stalls of the judiciary presents a number of other aspects, some of which will be clarified below.
A. Independence revisited
"Judges must be shielded from coercion of any sort particularly from executive control
over the performance of their judicial duties"
(Lord Chief Justice Lane)
In the first instance, it must be pointed out that the independence of the courts does not entail
that the latter are not accountable to no-one, because if that were the case, their independence
would degenerate into irresponsibility.
1 Shetreet, S., "L'independance et la responsabilite des juges et des avocats'\ in: Pessoa Vaz,
A.M., Role and Organisation of Judges and Lawyers in Contemporary Societies (1995)
Coimbra, p. 113 et seq.
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Independence, in other words, is not an end in itself, but an "instrumental value'^, a means of
safeguarding a fundamental value, that of the impartiality of the judge, which for centmes has
been symbolised by the blindfolded Lady of Justice. The essence of judicial activity resides in
that it is exercised by an impartial and neutral third party.
In the explanation given below, I will attempt to draw up a typological classification for this
kind of independence, adding a few comments. I would also refer to the abundant literature on
the independence of the judiciary3.
1. Independence towards the three constitutional authorities
The courts' independence towards the legislature and the executive are self-evident propositions,
although they are not invariably respected in practice.
Indeed, the courts' dependence of the legislature continues to express itself through laws which
are retroactive in their effect, or, worse still, intervene in pending proceedings. Less directly, but
no less nefariously, does it come to expression in the budget laws which, throughout the world
with the exception of Costa Rica, provide inadequate financial scope for the efficient operation
of the courts.
That Parliament is seeking, in a subtle manner, to retain its hold on the judiciary is something
which emerges from trend shown by the former to act as a substitite for the courts and to
arrogate to itself certain powers of enquiry. Here, the fmstration experienced by the Parliaments
Cappelletti, M., "Who matches the watchmen", in The Judicial Process in Comparative
Perspective (1989) Oxford, p. 70
for a historical overview, cf. Picardi, N., "L'independance et la responsabilite desjuges et des
avocats, Apercu historique", in Pessoa Vaz, A.M., op. cit. p. 71 et seq.; cf. in particular the
excellent comparative stady made on the occasion of the Congresses of the International
Association of Procedural Law in Wtirzburg (1983) and in Coimbra (1991) by Schwab, K.H.,
and Gottwald, P., "Verfassung und Zivilprozess'\ in Habscheid, W., Effektiver Rechtsschutz und
verfassungsmaBige Ordnung (1983), Bielefeld, p. 1-89; Vescovi. E., "La independencia de la
magistraturd\ ibid., p. 161-214; cf. also Picardi, N. and Shetreet, S., "Independance et
responsabilite desjuges et des avocats", in Pessoa Vaz, A.M., Role and organsiation of judges
amd lawyers in contemporary societies (1995) Coi'mbra, p. 73-144; Roth, G., "Organisation und
soziale Status der Richter'\ in: Pessoa Vaz, A.M., op. cit. p. 147-186).
at no longer being able to control governments is being channelled into controlling the judiciary.
The Van Traa Commission in the Netherlands and the Dutroux-commission in Belgium are
examples of this.
The dependence of the courts of the executive remains an important consideration in those
countries where the appointment of judges remains one of the prerogatives of the executive.
However, there is a much more subtle danger in this context, which is that of management
development by the Ministry of Justice. This has nothing to do with our plea for productivity
analyses and managerial justice among the judiciary (on this subject, cf. infra).
The real threat is that of making the judiciary an official field service of the Ministry of Justice.
It has been proposed that management functions be conferred on the decision-making judges, on
which regular reports would need to be submitted to the Minister; the latter could, if a negative
verdict was returned on this management, request the Supreme Court to remove the judge in
question from his managerial office.
However, there is also the question of the independence of the courts towards the judges as a
body, both collectively and individually. Unfortunately, the threat of conformity and
corporatism is as real as it ever has been.
Another threat is that of the collegiate attitude within a particular court. The story which
concerned the American Supreme Court, and which was published in The Brethren stands, if
true, as a frightening example of this attitude.
A man who had been condemned to death had appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that his
verdict had been reached in an improper manner. Judge Blackmun, who was considered to be a
member of the conservative camp, had, on behalf of the majority, drawn up a decision stating
the reasons why the complaints made were unfounded, or at least could not serve to reverse the
verdict. Against this view. Judge Marshall had advanced a dissenting opinion which carried such
conviction with some members of the majority that they changed their minds. However, this was
still insufficient to obtain a majority for Marshall's viewpoint. In order to obtain that majority, it
was necessary that one more judge should change camps. Hopes were pinned on the progressive
Judge Brennan. The latter was approached for this purpose by one of his clerks. How-ever,
Brennan refused to withdraw his vote from the Blackmun majority verdict. He was alleged to
have given the following reason for his refusal: he considered it undesirable to go against Judge
Blackmun - who had recently shown signs of moving slightly in a progressive direction - by
turning against his opinion, which had been prepared with such care, at a time when a number of
Woodward and Armstrong, The Brethren
more important cases needed to be decided in which it was important to obtain Blackmun's
support.
A number of comments should be made in relation to the first type of independence.
(a) The principle of the separation of powers was abandoned some considerable time ago.
Therefore it is legitimate to require that the independence of the courts, which is essentially a
form of autonomy, should not stand in the way of co-operation between the three fundamental
powers.
Here, we are talking of co-operation with the legislature which enabled the Plenary Council of
the Supreme Court in the former Soviet Union to have the right to initiate legislation, or which
allowed the French Coui' de Cassation to make proposals for the improvement of legislation in
its annual report.
We are also talking about co-operation with the executive which enables the courts to request
information from the administration as is the case with the European Court of Justice .
(b) Within the judiciary, collective independence may not degenerate into the autonomy of
individual judges, who object to co-operation of any kind in the battle against the slowness and
delays in the judicial process.
I am not suggesting that energetic judges should take over the case files of their more indolent
colleagues. The latter should be the subject of much more expedient disciplinary action.
However, it is an established and objective fact that certain judges and courts have a heavier
workload than others. The latter would then need to be mobilised in order to obtain a fairer
distribution of work.
This will also enable the judiciary to make it clear that it is facing up to its responsibility to solve
itself the problems ofslowness and delays.
2. The judiciary and its members must adopt an independent attitude towards the world of
politics. The latter does not make this very easy, since in many countries judges are still being
5 Article 21 of the Statrte of the Court of Justice; cf. Article 138 of the Belgian Judicial Code,
which stipulates that, in the course of labour disputes, the Public Prosecutor may request
information from the appropriate authority; cf. also on this subject Koopmans, T., "Judicial
activism and procedural hw", in:(1993) European Review of Private Law (ERPL) 67 et seq.; at
p. 81
appointed by those in political authority, and the size, appropriation and management of the
justice budget is mostly removed from the involvement of the judiciary. All this constitites a
threat to the independence of the judges.
For many years now, I have been teaching my students that a judge must suffer from a
Becket-complex, referring to Thomas Becket who, following his appointtnent as Lord
Chancellor by Henry II, informed the latter: "I was your friend, now I am your Lord
Chancellor". When I told this story to the Chairman of the Supreme Court of Argentina, of
whom it was said that he was a notorious friend of President Menem, he answered tersely: "I
have remained President Menem's friend".
However, I have also taught my students that it is impossible to be a judge and at the same time
man the barricades. The well-known "phenomene Magnaud" is never far away.
3. The last-named point brings me to to a very special - and perhaps the most fundamental -
application of the independence principle, to wit, the impartiality of the judge, towards himself,
towards the parties, and towards their lawyers.
He must be impartial towards himself, which means that the judge must leave behind his own
philosophical, ideological, political and other beliefs when adjudicating a case. If he does not
consider himself capable of doing so, he must withdraw from the case. This I could well imagine
that a judge, whose child had been killed by a drunken driver, could not be in a position to settle
a similar case with the necessary degree of detachment.
He must be impartial towards the parties, a requirement which is imposed by statite in virtually
all the systems of court procedure throughout the world. If this does not suffice, reliance can be
placed on the impartial judge principle laid down in Article 6 of the ECHR and Article 14 of the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights.
However, he must also be impartial towards the lawyers, especially if these lawyers play an
important part in the social system, or if they belong to what Yves Dezalay has called the
"marchands de droit qui cumulent la triple fonction de conseiller les auteurs de nonnes, de
plaider les litiges qu'elles suscitent et de commenter les decisions qui les appliquent" ("those
salesmen of the law who combine the three functions of consulting the authors of rules, of
pleading in the disputes which these provoke, and of commenting the decisions which apply
them").
4. Finally, the judge must adopt an attitude of impartiality towards public opinion in general,
which requires a kind of so-called "insulation" - particularly from the press and the rest of the
media.
Even though the judge must listen to that which is happening in society he is not allowed to give
a ruling on the basis of that which public opinion thinks or expects. On the occasion of a recent
tragic car collision which happened in the mist of dawn, and in which several people died, one
of the lorry drivers responsible was immediately arrested, which was clearly done under the
pressure of public opinion, since it was hardly appropriate in the circumstances to claim the need
for an inquiry. Recently, I heard an examining judge state that public opinion would not
understand if he released X, who was at that moment in custody pending trial. Surely this is
wrong.
As far as the communication media are concerned, I remain in favour of a rigid application of
the sub judice principle: that which must still be decided judicially may not be made public, let
alone commented on or criticised. In this respect, I would refer to that which Wolfram Henckel
wrote some time ago: "Die Gerichtsberichterstattung der Medien sollte erkennen dass auch
schon der Anschein bewusster oder unbewusster Einflussnahme auf laufende Gerichtsverfahren
den Rechtsstaat gefahrdet. Der Richter kann sich dagegen nicht wehren. Der Berichterstattung
und Kommentierung wachst damit eine hohe Verantwortung zu, die mit dem Abschluss des
Verfahrens nicht endet. Das Vertrauen der Burger zu den Richtem und dem Rechtsstaat wird
wesentlich beeinflusst durch die Darstellung und Kommentienmg der Urteile in Zeitungen,
Rundfmk mid Femsehen. Der im Grundgesetz verbrieften Freiheit mid Unabhangigkeit der
Presse muss in gleicher Weise wie der Unabhangigkeit der Richter die Verantwortung fw die
Erhaltung unseres demokratischen und sozialen Rechtstaat zur Seite stehen. Wer diese Freiheit
nicht verantwortlich gebraucht, untergrabt die Verfassung und schwacht die Organe, die allein
die Freiheit garantieren konnen" ("When reporting on court cases, the media should recognise
that even the semblance of a conscious or subconscious influence on the case pending imperils
the rule of law. The judge is unable to defend himself against this. Therefore, those responsible
for reporting and commenting on cases have a considerable responsibility which does not end
with the conclusion of the proceedings. The confidence placed by the citizen in the courts and in
the rule of law is influenced to a considerable extent by the manner in which decisions are
presented and commented on in the newspapers, as well as on radio and television. The
constititional values of the freedom and independence of the press must, to the same extent as
this is the case with the independence of the courts, be buttressed by the responsibility for the
safeguarding of our mle of law as it expresses itself in the democratic and social arenas. Anyone
who fails to use this freedom in a responsible manner undermines the Constitution and weakens
those organs which are the only ones capable of guaranteeing freedom"6.
B. The "bondage^
Sometimes authors make reference to "Ie mythe de I'independance" (the independence myth)7:
"L'independance est un mythe. Mais elle est un des mythes constitutifs de la Justice et de la
democratic.
La revendication de 1'independance est liee a celle de la separation des pouvoirs: Ie juge est
independant parce que Ie corps des magistrats 1'est par rapport au pouvoir executif. Mais cette
affirmation, formulee in abstracto, comme principe et comme realite ne manque pas d'audace.
Dans un monde domine par I'interdependance des hommes et des circonstances, elle est une
gageure et un defi.
Les philosphes, les economistes ou les psychologues trouveront qu'il est plus insense pour un
juge de revendiquer son independance qu'a une molecule d'affirmer sa liberte.
Non seulement cette exigence est irrealiste mais, poussee a 1'extreme, elle est dangereuse. Quel
risque ne court pas Ie citoyen livre au jugement d'un homme qui ne se reconnait aucune
dependance ?
Car, Ie voila, du coup, lie a un etre qui pretend echapper aux hierarchies, aux filiations, a la
causalite generale qui conduit Ie monde".
("Independence is a myth. However, it is one of the myths which contribute towards justice and
democracy.
The justification for the independence of the judge is linked to that given for the separation of
powers: the judge is independent because as a body, the judges are independent towards the
executive. However, this statement, which is formulated in the abstract sense, is not without
audacity either as a principle and as a reality.
In a world dominated by the interdependence between men and circumstances, it is a challenge
and a test.
6 Richter im demokratischen und sozialen Rechtsstaat, (1987( JZ, 209 et seq., at p. 215
7Lallemand, R, in Juger (5/1993), p. 6
Philosophers, economists and psychologists will be of the opinion that there is less sense in a
judge proclaiming his independence than there is in a molecule claiming its freedom.
Not only is this requirement an unrealistic one, but, taken to its ultimate conclusion, it is a
dangerous concept. What risk is there not for the citizen who is exposed to the judgment of a
man who does not acknowledge any dependence ?
The fate of that citizen is thereby linked to a being who claims to elude all hierarchies,
relationships, and the general causation which governs this world").
Naturally the above passage paints a totally distorted picture. Independence is not a myth, but is
the reality; however, in the words of a President of the French Cour de Cassation, the judge has
"autant de dependances que d'independance" (as many elements of dependence as of
independence).
In fact, this is what this topic is all about: all those elements against which the judge is incapable
of adopting a position of independence.
1. Laws, Constitutions and Treaties In spite of the very broad scope for interpretation, to which
we have already drawn the attention above, the link with the prescribed rules remains an
essential one. Radbmch had already expressed this very well where he wrote: "So ist juristische
Interpretation nicht Nachdenken eines Vorgedachten, sondem zu Ende Denken eines Gedachten
...." ("Thus legal interpretation is not about thinking about a previous idea but about thinking it
through to its conclusion...")0.
2. One aspect which tends to be forgotten is that the judge is bound by the facts which feature in
the account given to him by the parties. The judge puts these facts into their proper legal
perspective. The account of the facts often has the solution - even the legal solution - woven into
its fabric.
3. It is unthinkable for the post-modem judge not to be guided by that which actually occurs in
society. He has to "keep his ear to the ground" and follow that which is happening in society; in
so doing, he must announce that which is to come, put into words that which is already latent,
and, on one solitary occasion, call a halt to developments which he considers to be negative.
8 ("Arten der Interpretation", in: Recueil d'Etides sur les sources du droit en 1'honneur de
Fran9ois Geny (1934) Paris, T.II, p. 218
4. The judiciary is a public service which must not only operate, but also, and especially operate
in time. The sole legal provision to deal with this issue is the well-known Article 6 of the ECHR,
which has the "reasonable time" requirement - but nothing more. In the words of President
Pierre Drai: "Ignorant ou feignant d'ignorer Ie "facteurtemps", lejuge civil ne rend plus que des
decisions qui, s'etant trop fait attendre, ne font plus peur ou ne sont plus credibles" ("In
disregarding, or pretending to disregard, the time factor, the civil judge merely makes decisions
which, because of their excessive delay, no longer deter and are no longer credible") .
We are therefore dealing here with a public service which supplies products - i.e. decisions and
judgments - whose delivery deadline has not been determined. This is, moreover, the most
important and elevated of public services, that which is required to solve human conflicts, to
make legal pronouncements, and to ensure that justice is done. However, the superior nature of
this activity does not justify the circumstance that in most cases it is not subject to any time
limits.
The quality of the product, to use that terminology again, is, however, open to criticism. Not
only are there the many remedies, which serve to give the producer a second opportunity
("opposition", objection by third parties, and, to a certain extent, withdrawal of res judicata) or
which transfer to another product (appeal, review by the Supreme Court, Strasbourg), as well as
the liability of the producer himself (both civil and criminal liability, in the shape of secondary
action against the judge and the criminal action for refusal to adjudicate). Sometimes even the
State, seen as a business, can be held liable for unsatisfactory products supplied by the judicial
subsidiary (cf. the Belgian Anca decision, of which more below). However, delivery which is
late or out of time is not as yet the subject-matter of sanctioning in the national legal systems.
It will of course, be objected that any comparison with punctual delivery by a business concern
is defective because the courts, as a service, can only operate properly where the parties and
their counsels have made a timely and complete delivery of the raw materials in the shape of the
case file containing the facts, arguments and evidence.
This criticism fails to take into account that any properly functioning business also has firm
arrangements with the supplier of raw materials and/or with its subcontractors.
Applied by analogy to the courts, this means that the judge must be able to impose on the parties
and on their counsels time limits for the communication of their documents, the provision of
evidence, the submission of their pleadings and the presentation of their oral findings, in order to
"Z 'execution des decisions judiciaires et les moyens de pression a la disposition du tribunal",
(1986)RIDCat512)
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ensure that the case in its entirety is settled within a reasonable period. As long as this is not the
case, the acute perception of the time factor by the parties involved in a case will fail to be
satisfactorily allayed in our court proceedings.
5. Judges must also be accountable. However, this accountability must be regulated in an
efficient and formal manner, in order to avoid a situation whereby the judges are judged by the
media, because, as Cappelletti rightly remarked longtime ago, "The worst of all kinds of trials:
trial by newspapermen".
I have in the past personally advocated that a productivity study be applied to the courts .
However, recent experiences of mine has led me to make another proposal.
Since 1996, I had the privilege to have chaired, in the Netherlands, in Belgium, in Latvia, an
audit Committee, which was responsible for examining the quality of legal training at the
Faculties of Law, and to draw up a report on its findings for the benefit of those responsible for
policymaking in university education.
The Commission consisting of some more members, received, prior to each Faculty visit, a
so-called "selfstidy", in which the Faculty in question introduced itself, explained its objectives,
working methods and programmes, and subjected its strengths and weaknesses to critical
appraisal. In the course of the visit, members representing the Faculty at all levels were invited
and interviewed. This was followed by a comprehensive report on the current situation. These
visits take place every five years.
Similarly, the courts could be visited every five years by a commission consisting of professors,
judges, lawyers and representatives of the citizens. A report would be submitted to Parliament.
At least once every year, the president of each tribunal would need to submit a report to the
Justice Commission of the Parliament. The citizen should be in a position to learn about the
manner in which the public funds - which in most countries amount to puny sums - allocated to
the administration of justice are expended.
6. We are also dealing here with a public semce organised for the benefit of the citizen, who has
a right to a fair trial. This requirement can be analysed more closely by applying four criteria: (a)
("Who watches the watchmen ? A comparative stidy on judicial responsibility", Amer. Joum.
Comp. Law, Vol 31,1 et seq., in particular 60).
n Mijmeringen van een jurist bij 1984 (1984) Antwerp, p. 109 et seq.
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participation (cf. supra on the subject of the decision-maldng process), (b) interpersonal respect
(the parties and/or their counsels need to be treated with respect), (c) neutrality (cf. supra on the
subject of independence) and (d) fairness of outcome .
The judge is also subject to this customer-friendly approach, under which the judge is no longer
the bogey man, but is rather cast in the role of a parent who listens to the accounts and questions
put to him or her by the people. Every party expects to be treated in a decent manner.
That this requirement of fairness of outcome is deeply embedded in the cultural and historical
dimension of the anthropological approach towards the law, is apparent from the fact that, in the
famous passage which relates to Achilles's shield. Homer makes a reference to judges who are
due to solve a dispute, and mischievously adds:
"Two golden talents lay amidst, in sight,
The prize of him who best adjudged the right'"
7. It is of course out of the question that the increasing power of the judges should fail to be
accompanied by an increase, not only in their responsibility, but also in their accountability.
There is currently general agreement on this proposition, but there is less consensus on the
manner in which this should be achieved and on those who should appraise them on this point. It
was Juvenal who had already asked the question: "Quis custodiet ipsos custodes ?"14.
Everybody stands to be judged by the judges: the citizen as well as the authorities, the executive
as well as the legislature (the latter proposition can no longer be doubted after the landmark
decisions of the European Court of Justice in Francovich and Brasserie de 1'Europe). But how
can the judges themselves be judged ?
Since everything has already been said on this subject, and that there is insufficient space in this
paper to go into this topic in greater detail, I would refer to the available literature on the
subject .
12 Tyler, T., "Procedure or result ? what do disputants ^> ant from legal authorities ?", in: A
Handbook of Dispute Resolution, A.D.R. in action, edited by K.J. Maclde, (1991) London, p. 19
et seq.
13 Ilias, 18, 508-509
14 Satume VI, 347-8
15 (the reader is more particularly referred to two masterpieces on this topic, Cappelletti, M.,
"Who -watches the watchmen ?" in: The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective op. cit p. 57
et seq.; Van Oevelen, A., De overheidsaansprakelijkheid voor het optreden van de rechterlijke
macht, Antwerpen, 1987, cf. also Storme, M., "Wie berecht de onoordeelkundige rechter ?", in
12
It is appropriate here to recall the ever valid conclusion drawn by M. Cappeletti, which is that
there is only "one main road for modem society to tread - the road of a "responsive" model.
This, of course, is a model that avoids the excesses of each of those discussed above. To do so,
the responsive model will prevent a corporate insulation of the judiciary, as well as an
uncontrolled, irresponsible anarchy of the individual judges, by combining a reasonable degree
of legal (civil, disciplinary and penal) responsibility, without, however, either subordinating the
judges to the political branches, political parties, or other societal organisations, or exposing
them to the vexatious suits of irritated litigants' .
This direction has already been in part adopted by a number of countries . It was also followed
to a certain extent by the Belgian Hofvan Cassatie in the Anca decision of 19 December 1991,
according to which the State is liable for the damage which may result from a judicial decision
which turned out to be unlawful.
I take the personal view that this last-named principle should be completed by means of
recovery liability of the judge, should the latter have committed gross negligence. There are
elements of this last-named solution in the systems adopted in France and in Germany18.
Ghent, 29 June 2010
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Feestbundel F. Dumon (1983) Bmssels, 695 et seq.).
16 op. cit. p. 112
cf. Cappelletti, supra; cf. also Graziadei, M. and Mattei, U., ^Judicial responsibility in Italy: a
new statute" (1990) Amer. Joum. Comp. Law, 103 et seq.
18 action recursoire, Ruckgriff: Cappelletti, op. cit. p. 87-8^
